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DENIAL OF HEARING
AT THREE MILE ISLAND HELD TO BE ERROR

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to hold hearings at the request of any interested person when considering nuclear
power plant license amendments, notwithstanding an NRC finding
of "no significant hazard." Sholly v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 15 ERC 1231 (1981); cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3882, 80-1640
(May 26, 1981), 651 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rehearingdenied,
651 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3882

(U.S. May 26, 1981).
INTRODUCTION
Since the nuclear accident of March, 1979, decontamination of
the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant has posed a continuous problem. The accident caused unknown amounts of radioactive
gas to form inside the reactor building. Clean-up and technical crews
therefore could not enter the disabled reactor without first purging
the radioactive gas. The licensee' contended, and the NRC agreed,
that the release of the radioactive gas into the atmosphere was a necessary function of the decontamination process. 2 To begin this process, the TMI licensee needed the permission of the NRC.
The accident prompted the NRC to issue an "Order for Modification of License," 3 which suspended the plant's operating license and
required a shutdown of the reactor. On February 11, 1980, the license
was further modified to prohibit purging the radioactive gas until approved by the NRC. 4 The decontamination process began when the
NRC later published an Assessment of Decontamination,' in.which it
recommended "that the building atmosphere be decontaminated by
purging to the environment through the building's hydrogen control
system." 6 In that assessment, the NRC determined that the venting
1. Metropolitan Edison So., Pennsylvania Electric Co., and Jersey Central Power and
Light Co. jointly hold the operating license to the Three Mile Island nuclear plant and are
referred to as licensee or General Public Utilities Company.
2. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,265 (1980).
3. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,271 (1980).
4. 45 Fed. Reg. 11,282 (1980).
5. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,265 (1980).

6. Id.
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of radioactive gas into the atmosphere at the TMI site would not
cause a "significant environmental impact" 7 because the offsite doses
would not exceed limits set by the NRC.
On June 12, 1980, the NRC issued two unpublished orders which
became effective immediately approving the release of the radioactive
gas. The "Order for Temporary Modification of License" 8 (OTML)
permitted the TMI licensee to release the radioactive gas at a faster
rate than existing specifications allowed. 9 The second order, "Memorandum and Order" ' ' 0 (hereinafter venting order) authorized the
venting of the radioactive gas into the atmosphere to begin on June
22, 1980.
On June 16, 1980, the plaintiffs in Sholly v. NRC, a group comprised of concerned individuals and an environmental group, 1' asked
that the NRC reconsider its finding of no significant environmental
impact and its decision to make the OTML and the venting order
effective immediately. The NRC failed to respond to this request.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs' petition for an emergency injunction and declaratory relief on June 16, 1980. A few days later, the plaintiffs requested
a hearing before the NRC to challenge the two June orders. The hearing was never held. Instead, the licensee began to vent the radioactive
gas at a faster rate, pursuant to the OTML, until the venting was
completed on July 11, 1980.
On appeal,' 2 the plaintiffs contended that the venting order and
the OTML were amendments to the operating license and that their
statutory right to notice and hearing in such proceedings had been
7. Id.
An environmental impact is any alteration of environmental conditions or
creation of new set of environmental conditions, adverse or beneficial, caused
or induced by the action or set of actions under consideration. Assessment of
the significance of the environmental impact generally involves two major elements: a quantitative measure of magnitude and a qualitative measure of importance. Such a determination is a matter of agency judgement and concensus at the project level.
K. LEE and L. L. KOUMJIAN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 10 2d ed. 1978).
8. 651 F.2d 780, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
9. See, 10C.F.R. § 20.101-20.108 (1980).
10. 651 F.2d 780, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
11. Steven Sholly, Donald E. Hossler and an environmental group named "People
Against Nuclear Energy."
12. On July 8, 1980, a petition for review (No. 80-1783) and an accompanying petition
for writ of mandamus (No. 80-1784) were filed in the Third Circuit. Those cases were transferred to the District of Columbia Circuit and consolidated for review with No. 80-1691, the
case originally filed in that court.
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denied.' 3 The plaintiffs pointed to section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'" which requires the NRC to give notice and hold
a hearing on license amendments when requested to do so by interested persons.
The NRC responded that, under section 189(a), the agency has
authority to dispense with a public hearing upon a finding that an action will not cause harm to public health and safety.1 s That section
states that "the Commission may dispense with ...

notice and publi-

cation.., upon a determination ...that the amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration."' 6 The NRC argued that the word
"hearing" is implied where the word "notice" is found in the statute.
According to the NRC, the statute permits the agency to dispense
with notice, publication, and hearings upon a finding of no significant environmental hazard.
The court in Sholly analyzed the OTML and the venting order separately and held that both orders were license amendments which
triggered the hearing requirements of section 189(a). The court held
that the NRC was required to hold a hearing at the plaintiffs' request,
and therefore did not reach the question of whether the Commission
was required to provide 30 days' notice of its intent to issue the license amendments without a hearing.
As a secondary issue, the NRC also contended that the plaintiffs'
claim for injunctive and declaratory relief was moot because the
radioactive gas had already been released into the atmosphere and
the two June orders had expired. The court held that the plaintiffs'
claim was not moot because the actions of the NRC and the licensee
were "capable of repetition, yet evading review."'
MOOTNESS
The NRC argued that dismissal of the suit was proper because the
dispute was already settled and therefore no issue of continuing prac13. Judicial review of government decisions concerning atomic energy is authorized by
section 189(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (1976). Section 301
of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5871(g) (1976), § 502(a) of the
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 7192(a) (Supp. III 1979),
and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (1976) grant the United States courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over all final NRC orders reviewable under 42 U.S.C. § 2239(B) (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
15. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d); § 2133(d); § 2201(b) (1976).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
17. See, Southern Pacific Terminal v. Int. Comm. Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498 (1911), Nader
v. Volpe, 475 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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tical importance to the real interests of the litigants remained to justify judicial review. The court held that the plaintiffs' claim was not
moot. The court looked to Article III of the United States Constitution, which restricts the exercise of federal judicial power to "cases
or controversies."' '8 This constitutional provision limits judicial review to real and substantial controversies capable of conclusive judicial relief.' 9 Litigants must also have a sufficient personal interest in
the outcome of the case.2 0 These requirements are intended to assure
the presentation of concrete issues in an adversary setting. 2' The
court in Sholly held that an actual controversy existed between the
NRC, the licensee and the plaintiffs, and that the parties had a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of the case.2 2
In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FederalPower Commission,2 3 the
court held that the mootness doctrine was applicable to agency action
as well as to private action. Courts may determine that moot cases
are still justiciable if they involve "short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review." ' 4
A case is considered to be justiciable if "the litigant shows the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy
that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest." 2 In Sholly, the plaintiffs had to show that the NRC's orders
were "short-term, capable of repetition, yet evading review" and that
"there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subject to the same action again." ' 6 The chances of the
NRC making such orders effective immediately and allowing the
purging of the radioactive gas into the atmosphere in the future supported "reasonable expectations that the same complaining parties
will be denied their statutory rights to a hearing and notice." 2 '
The court reasoned that the issue before it was not simply whether
the NRC would again allow the release of radioactive gas into the atmosphere without first giving notice and holding hearings. The court
18. U.S. Constitution art. III, § 2.
19. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
20. Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
22. When a real controversy ceases to exist or the parties lose a legally cognizable interest in its outcome, the federal courts, under the mootness doctrine, no longer have the
power to decide the issue. Under certain factual situations, however, the courts allow an individual's action to survive despite the parties' loss of a personal intereset in the merits of
the case if the claim itself is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See, Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
23. 606 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
24. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
25. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
26. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
27. Id.
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also considered whether the NRC could continue making license
amendments effective immediately without allowing a hearing, even
when requested, whenever the agency decides that the amendment
involves no significant environmental hazards. This problem would
never be addressed if the legal proceedings take longer to resolve than
the time it takes to physically release the gas. The licensee would
have only to release the gas prior to any court action to avoid judicial
review. The court recognized this timing problem and ruled for immediate consideration and resolution of a controversy surrounding
"irreversible and irretrievable" future events.
NOTICE AND HEARING
Once the mootness question was decided, the court considered the
hearing requirements of section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, which provides in part that:
In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending,
revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit.... the
Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit
any such person as a party to such proceeding.2 8
The plaintiffs argued that the OTML was an amendment to the operating license and thus, the NRC was obligated under the AEA to provide a hearing upon request.
The NRC conceded that the OTML was an amendment, but drew
the court's attention to the last sentence of section 189(a), which
states that it "may dispense with ... notice and publication ... upon
a determination ... that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration." 2 9 Such a determination implies that there is no
perceived danger or harm to public health and safety. The NRC reasoned that it was within its discretion and power to find no significant hazard from the release of radioactive gas because it found no
imminent or immediate danger to public safety posed by the controlled release of that gas. The NRC further argued that its finding of
no significant hazard permitted the commission to dispense with a
hearing because "notice" and "hearing" are inextricable. The commission contended that section 189(a) also refers to "hearing" when
it mentions "notice" because both phrases are so closely related that
the mention of one naturally implies a reference to the other.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had previously
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
29. Id.
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held in Brooks v. Atomic Energy Commission3" that section 189(a)
clearly requires the commission to grant a hearing with respect to license amendments upon the request of any interested party. In
Brooks, the court rejected the NRC's contention that it may dispense
with the hearing requirement when it determines that the amendment
contains no significant hazards consideration. 3 The court rejected
the same arguments in Sholly because of the Brooks decision and on
the basis of a legislative analysis of section 189(a).
The court found that the legislative history of the amendment distinguishes the requirements of hearing and notice.3 2 A mandatory
hearing is required only on the application for issuance of a construction permit. 3 3 Legislative history indicates that the issuance of
amendments to operational licenses "would be only after a 30 day
public notice, and an offer of a hearing' '3 4 (emphasis added). The
court's opinion did not specifically address the notice issue.
The court also rejected the NRC's argument that the requirements
of notice and hearing are so interrelated that Congress intended to
merge the two in the third sentence of section 189(a). That sentence
provides that, "the Commission may dispense with such thirty day
notice

. . .

with respect ... to an amendment ... upon a determina-

tion by the Commission that the amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration." 3 The court interpreted that sentence in conjunction with the fourth sentence of section 189(a) to mean that Congress did intend to separate the two requirements of notice and hearing.36 The court stated that the legislative history of the third sentence
indicated that Congress intended "to lessen the mandatory hearing
requirements only when there was no request for a hearing. ' '
Although there was a question in Sholly as to whether the plaintiffs formally requested a hearing prior to the issuance of the OTML,
an expression of interest may be sufficient to constitute a request for
a hearing. 3 8 "Certainly logic compels the conclusion, as Congress
recognized, that one may not timely request a hearing if he lacks
30. 476 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31. In dictum, however, the same court later stated that "an amendment can be made
without the opportunity for a hearing if the [NRC] determines that it involves no significant hazards consideration." Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 499
F.2d 1068, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 1966, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962); S. REP. NO. 1677, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1962).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
36. 651 F.2d 780, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
37. Id.
38. Brooks v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 476 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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notice that the Commission is about to take action." 3

Legislative

history indicates that Congress intended the NRC to be able to dispense with notice and publication upon a finding of no significant
40
hazard consideration, but not with the hearing requirement.
The NRC argued that the venting order, which authorized the licensee to vent the radioactive gas into the atmosphere, was not a
license amendment and, therefore, was not subject to the hearing requirements of section 189(a). The NRC contended that the venting
order was not an amendment because it only lifted the prior suspension of the licensee's authority to vent; the order did not authorize

the release of a greater amount of radioactive gas than that permitted
by the original operation license. Because the venting order gave the

licensee power in excess of that permitted by the original licensee, it
was held to be an amendment to that license and was therefore within
the scope of section 189(a) and its hearing requirements.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act and
its relation to the NRC decision-making process and to subsequent

judicial review are the essential issues in Sholly v. NRC. The court
viewed the issues as mere definitional problems and went through a
laborious exercise to explain its interpretation of what Congress

meant by "hearing" and "notice." The issues presented, however, involve more than semantics.
The operation of nuclear power reactors inevitably creates great
amounts of highly radioactive waste, 4 ' and the potential for many
unforeseeable technical problems. 4" More than 70 commercial nuclear reactors are in operation in this country and the NRC has pro39. Id. at 927.
40. H.R. REP. NO. 1966, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962); S. REP. NO. 1677, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1962).
41. For example, Plutonium-239, a radioisotope connected with nuclear waste hazards,
has been shown to cause lung tumors in experimental animals in inhaled doses as small as
one microcurie, which corresponds to 25 millionths of a gram. W. BAIR, C. RICHMOND &
B. WACHOLZ, A RADIOBIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIATION DOSE FROM INHALED PLUTNOIUM, table Ill-A (Atomic Energy
Comm'n Report WASH-1300, 1974). See also, P. FAULKNER, THE SILENT BOMB 115
(1977), for a further discussion on nuclear wastes.
42. For example, evidence suggests that a manual shut-off of a pressure-operated relief
valve that was open for two hours prevented a total core meltdown that could have occurred
absent the manual shut-off within 30 to 60 minutes. Report of The President's Commission
on the Accident at TMI (Kemeny Report) 51-56 (1979);Also see, R. D. Pollard, THE NUGGET FILE (1979), for excerpts from the government's special file on nuclear power plant
accidents and safety defects obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act.
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jected that over 500 such reactors will be in operation by the year
2000."
Perhaps the court's decision should have placed more emphasis on considerations of nuclear safety.
The statutes under which the NRC operates seem to grant the
agency broad powers in fostering nuclear development and in making
determinations about public health and safety. 4" Public debate, in
the form of public hearings, affords perhaps the best means for assuring that government and industry adhere strongly to public health
and safety considerations. 4
ERENIO GUTIERREZ, JR.

43. Mannenbach, The Decision to Choose Nuclear Power Before and After Three Mile
Island, 11 ENVT'L L. 421 (1981).
44. Compare, 42 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d); 2133(b); 2134(a),
(d), 2201(i); 2232(a) (1976).
45. This case has made a positive impact on the TMI community. The NRC has established an advisory panel for the purpose of obtaining input from the residents of the TMI
area which will participate in commission decisional processes. The panel membership consists of three residents of the TMI vicinity, three people from the scientific community,
three members of state agencies and three people from local goverment agencies. See, 45
Fed. Reg. 71692, 76306 (1980).

